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EXPERT TESTIMONY, SCENES A FAIRE, AND
TONAL MUSIC: A (NOT SO) NEW TEST FOR
INFRINGEMENT
Jeffrey Cadwell*
I. INTRODUCTION
Jollie v. Jaques' was one of the first music infringement
cases reported in the United States.2 Its music infringement
inquiry set the basis used by later courts in evaluating such
cases.3 Although much has changed in terms of culture, tech-
nology, and musical style since the 1850s, the general test for
infringement of copyrighted musical works has changed very
little. Jollie set a precedent for treating music in the same
manner as any other work protectible by copyright.4 In Jollie,
the court held that infringement occurred whenever there
was "appropriation of the whole [of plaintiffs work] or of any
substantial part of it without the license of the author."5 Jo1-
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1. Jollie v. Jaques, 13 F. Cas. 910 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1850) (No. 7,437) (involv-
ing two different arrangements of a German polka known as "The Serious Fam-
ily Polka").
2. J. Michael Keyes, Musical Musings: The Case for Rethinking Music
Copyright Protection, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 407, 411 (2004).
3. Id.
4. Keyes, supra note 2, at 411. Copyright protects "original works of au-
thorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
Protectible works of authorship include: literary works; musical works; dra-
matic works; pantomimes and choreographic works; pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works; motion pictures and other audiovisual works; sound re-
cordings; and architectural works. Id. § 102(a)(1)-(8).
5. Jollie, 13 F. Cas. at 913. Jollie was decided under the Copyright Act of
1831. See id. at 911. Under the 1831 Act, copyright protection extended to "any
book or books, map, chart, or musical composition." Copyright Act, § 1, 4 Stat.
436 (1831) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000)). Printed music was
first specifically protected under the 1831 Act, although before 1831, composers
registered their sheet music under the books category. EDWARD SAMUELS, THE
ILLUSTRATED STORY OF COPYRIGHT 31-32, 136 (2000).
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lie also contained issues similar to those found in more recent
music infringement cases, including the key factors of sub-
stantial similarity6 and expert testimony.7 As this comment
will discuss, because of the unique nature of musical works,
reliance on evolving variations of the Jollie test has been
problematic and must be refined.8
This comment will first provide background on the two
major approaches to copyright infringement that have been
developed by the case law.9 Second, because both approaches
limit expert testimony, this comment will identify the prob-
lems that arise from this limitation.1" Third, this comment
will analyze the traditional approaches to music infringe-
ment, focusing on the unique nature of music and the reasons
expert testimony should not be limited." Finally, this com-
ment proposes a restructured test for music infringement
that includes expert testimony throughout.12
II. BACKGROUND: 13 FROM TIN PAN ALLEY TO MCDONALD'S:
THE TWO MAJOR APPROACHES TO INFRINGEMENT
A. Copyright Infringement
Copyright infringement is "an unpermitted exercise by
the defendant of a right or rights in a copyrighted work ac-
corded to the plaintiff by the Copyright Act itself."14 Under
the Copyright Act of 1976, an owner of a valid copyright has
several exclusive rights, including the right of publication, the
right to prepare derivative works, and the right of public per-
formance. 5 Recently, the United States Supreme Court has
6. When works are substantially similar, the defendant has generally
taken "a substantial and material amount of plaintiffs protected expression."
MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 386 (3d ed. 1999).
7. Keyes, supra note 2, at 412.
8. See discussion infra Part IV.
9. See discussion infra Part II.
10. See discussion infra Part III.
11. See discussion infra Part IV.
12. See discussion infra Part V.
13. For more background on most of the cases discussed in this comment,
including sound clips to compare and contrast, as well as the full text of most
opinions, see Columbia Law School, Arthur W. Diamond Law Library Music
Plagiarism Project, http://www.ccnmtl.columbia.edu/projects/law/library/
caselist.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2005).
14. CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 667 (6th ed. 2003).
15. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
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instructed that a plaintiff must show two elements to prove
copyright infringement: "(1) ownership of a valid copyright,
and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are
original."16 These elements have remained quite similar
throughout the history of copyright infringement actions and
are the basis of two important copyright infringement cases
that have formed the backdrop for many music infringement
lawsuits.17 These two cases are discussed below.
B. The Arnstein Approach
In 1945, Ira B. Arnstein brought suit against the Ameri-
can songwriter Cole Porter," alleging that a number of Por-
ter's songs, including "Begin the Beguine," "Night and Day,"
"I Love You Madly," and 'You'd Be So Nice to Come Home
To," infringed the copyrights of songs written by Arnstein.1 9
The influential Arnstein v. Porter20 case set forth two ele-
ments a plaintiff must prove to establish a prima facie case of
infringement.2' First, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
16. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (cit-
ing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 548 (1985)).
17. 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
13.01, at 13-5 (2004). "Reduced to most fundamental terms, there are only two
elements necessary to the plaintiffs case in an infringement action: ownership
of the copyright by the plaintiff and copying by the defendant." Id. Nimmer
notes that, prior to the Feist decision, the previous sentence was "probably the
most oft-cited passage of this treatise." Id. at 13-5 n.5.1.
18. Cole Porter (1891-1964) wrote songs for both the Broadway stage and
the film screen. THEODORE BAKER, BAKER'S BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF
MUsICIANs 2843 (Nicolas Slonimsky & Laura Kuhn eds., Centennial ed. 2001)
(1900). He is perhaps best known for his musical comedy "Kiss Me Kate." Id.
Porter was also the subject of the 2004 film DE-LOVELY starring Kevin Kline as
Porter and Ashley Judd as Porter's wife, Linda. Internet Movie Database
(IMDb), DE-LOVELY (2004), http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0352277 (last visited
Jan. 23, 2005).
19. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946). Arnstein was "a liti-
gious immigrant from the Soviet Union who for ten years dogged the likes of
various songwriters, 20th Century Fox, ASCAP, and BMI, claiming that they all
had infringed on his music copyrights." Keyes, supra note 2, at 416. Other re-
ported cases brought by Arnstein include: Arnstein v. Edward B. Marks Music
Corp., 11 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1935), affd, 82 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1936); Arn-
stein v. ASCAP, 29 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); Arnstein v. Broadcast Music,
Inc., 137 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1943);Arnstein v. Twentieth Century Fox Film, Corp.,
52 F. Supp. 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
20. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
21. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468. See also Alice J. Kim, Expert Testimony and
Substantial Similarity: Facing the Music in (Music) Copyright Infringement
Cases, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 109, 112 (Fall 1994/Winter 1995) (citing 3
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §13.03[E], at 13-101 n.234 (1994)) (noting that
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defendant copied from the plaintiffs copyrighted work.22 Sec-
ond, the plaintiff must show that the copying constituted im-
proper appropriation.
23
1. The Copying Prong
According to Arnstein, the plaintiff must first show that
the defendant copied from the plaintiffs copyrighted musical
work.24 This showing is satisfied by either the defendant's di-
rect admission of copying or circumstantial evidence from
which the trier of fact may reasonably infer copying.25 Since
direct evidence of copying is unlikely to be available, the copy-
ing prong of the infringement test almost always involves the
use of circumstantial evidence.26 Generally, circumstantial
evidence requires a showing of two separate elements: (1)
that the defendant had access to the plaintiffs work, and (2)
that the defendant's work is similar to the plaintiffs work.27
a. The Access Element
The plaintiff in a copyright infringement action must
first show that the defendant had access to the plaintiffs
work.2' An early writer on musical copyright defined access
in terms of whether the accused composer had an opportunity
to become acquainted with the plaintiffs work.29 Further, one
of the leading copyright treatises 30 states that access should
not be inferred through speculation or conjecture, but rather
there must be a reasonable possibility of access to the plain-
tiffs work.3 ' Arnstein similarly points out that no amount of
Arnstein has been a very influential case).
22. Ownership of a valid copyright was later enumerated as a separate ele-
ment by the Supreme Court in Feist. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.,
499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). Arnstein's first prong would necessarily assume that
the plaintiff has ownership of a valid copyright since it refers to "plaintiffs
copyrighted work." See Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468 (emphasis added). The Copy-
right Act of 1976 indicates that registration before or within five years of publi-
cation constitutes prima facie proof of copyright validity. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c)
(2000).
23. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
24. id.
25. Id.
26. JOYCE ET AL., supra note 14, at 668.
27. See Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
28. Id.
29. ALFRED M. SHAk'TER, MUSICAL COPYRIGHT 219 (2d ed. 1939).
30. NIMMER, supra note 17.
31. 4Id. § 13.02[B], at 13-19 to 13-20.
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evidence of access can be used to show copying if there are no
similarities.12 The opinion also notes that if there is no evi-
dence of access, then "the similarities must be so striking as
to preclude the possibility that plaintiff and defendant inde-
pendently arrived at the same result."
33
b. The Similarity Element
With regard to the similarity circumstantial evidence
prong, striking similarity will generally be required if the
plaintiff has little or no evidence of access.3 4 Striking similar-
ity has been defined as "that degree of similarity as will per-
mit an inference of copying even in the absence of proof of ac-
cess."35 In order to prove striking similarity, the plaintiff
must show that the similarities between the two works in
question are of the sort that cannot be accounted for by coin-
cidence, independent creation, or prior common source. 6
Arnstein allows the use of expert testimony to demonstrate
striking similarity: "On [the issue of striking similarity],
analysis ('dissection') is relevant, and the testimony of experts
may be received to aid the trier of facts."37 Typically, in a mu-
sic infringement case, the expert will attempt to show how
certain melodic fragments, phrases, harmonic progressions,
or any combination thereof are similar between the musical
works at issue.
The evidentiary burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate
that the similarities between the plaintiffs work and the de-
fendant's work "are of a kind that can only be explained by
copying, rather than by coincidence, independent creation, or
prior common source."" Once the plaintiff makes out a prima
facie case of copying, there are two primary defenses a defen-
dant may raise to rebut the plaintiffs allegations. First, the
defendant may claim that he created the work independ-
ently.39 Second, the defendant may claim that both the plain-
32. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
33. Id.
34. Jeffrey G. Sherman, Musical Copyright Infringement: The Requirement
of Substantial Similarity, 22 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 81,84 & n.15 (1977).
35. Id.
36. See Stratchborneo v. Arc Music Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1393, 1403 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
37. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
38. See Stratchborneo, 357 F. Supp. at 1403.
39. See LEAFFER, supra note 6, at 385.
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tiffs work and the defendant's work have their origins in a
prior common source, such as a piece of music in the public
domain.4 °
c. The Relationship Between Access and Similarity
In many music infringement cases, tension arises as to
whether a strong case of striking similarity can overcome lack
of evidence of access. Selle v. Gibb41 provides a noteworthy
example of this tension.42  Ronald H. Selle brought suit
against the Bee Gees,43 alleging that the Bee Gees' song "How
Deep Is Your Love" infringed his song "Let it End." Selle's
song was written and copyrighted in 1975 and was played two
or three times in the Chicago area.45 Selle also sent a tape of
the song to eleven recording and publishing companies, eight
of whom returned the tape while three did not even respond.46
Although the jury originally returned a verdict in favor of
Selle, the district court judge granted the defendants' motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict primarily due to
Selle's inability to demonstrate that the Bee Gees had access
to "Let it End."47
On appeal, Selle relied primarily on striking similarity as
argued by his expert witness.48 Selle's expert witness testi-
fied that "the two songs had such striking similarities that
they could not have been written independent of one an-
other."49 Selle claimed that when such a strong case of strik-
40. Id.
41. Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1984).
42. Another famous example involving the tension between access and
striking similarity involved Broadway composer Andrew Lloyd Webber. Repp v.
Webber, 132 F.3d 882 (2d Cir. 1997). Ray Repp, an American church music
composer, claimed Lloyd Webber's "Phantom Song" copied Repp's "Till You." Id.
at 884. Despite Repp's music having limited distribution in religious markets
and the lack of a case of access by Lloyd Webber to Repp's song, the court al-
lowed an inference of access to stand based on a strong case of striking similar-
ity. Id. at 891.
43. The Bee Gees were formed by the brothers Robin, Maurice, and Barry
Gibb and were "perhaps the most successful white soul act of all time during the
disco era." The Bee Gees, VH1.com, http://www.vhl.com/artists/az/bee-gees/
bio.jhtmi (last visited Sept. 17, 2005).
44. Selle, 741 F.2d at 898.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 900.
48. Id. at 900-01.
49. Id. at 899 (quoting Transcript at 202). For a more detailed description
of Selle, including discussion of the expert testimony, see Michael Der
142 [Vol: 46
2005] A NEW TEST FOR MUSIC INFRINGEMENT
ing similarity is set forth, no evidence of access is necessary. 5°
The court responded to this argument by noting that "al-
though proof of striking similarity may permit an inference of
access, the plaintiff must still meet some minimum threshold
of proof which demonstrates that the inference of access is
reasonable.""' Here, Selle was unable to meet this minimum
threshold of proof because the court deemed the availability
of Selle's song as de minimis.52 Furthermore, since there was
no evidence that any of the Bee Gees or their associates were
in Chicago at any of the times Selle's song was performed,
Selle could not meet the threshold.53
Courts have also been willing to infer access based on the
widespread popularity of the allegedly infringed piece of mu-
sic.54 A notable instance of this type of inference involved
former Beatles member George Harrison. 5 In Bright Tunes
Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd.,6 the plaintiff alleged
that Harrison's "My Sweet Lord" infringed the plaintiffs song
"He's So Fine."57 In 1963, "He's So Fine" was a number one
hit for five weeks in the United States and, in Harrison's
home country of the United Kingdom, it was a number one
song for seven weeks.5" Even though Harrison defended him-
self by claiming independent creation,5 9 a verdict was re-
turned for the plaintiff on a theory of "subconscious copy-
Manuelian, The Role of the Expert Witness in Music Copyright Cases, 57
FORDHAM L. REV. 127, 139-43 (1988).
50. Selle, 741 F.2d at 900.
51. Id. at 902 (emphasis added).
52. Id. Generally, de minimis in the copyright context is "a technical viola-
tion of a right so trivial that the law will not impose legal consequences." Ring-
gold v. Black Entm't Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1997).
53. Selle, 741 F.2d at 903.
54. See LEAFFER, supra note 6, at 384.
55. Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 178. "He's So Fine" was written by Ronald Mack and made fa-
mous when recorded by the Chiffons in 1962. Id.
58. Id. at 179. Coincidentally, on June 1, 1963, "He's So Fine" was number
twelve on the British charts while a song by The Beatles held the number one
slot. Id.
59. Harrison testified that "My Sweet Lord" developed when he began
vamping on two chords after a press conference and singing the words "Hallelu-
jah" and "Hare Krishna" over the chords. Id. He then developed the idea fur-
ther with his band. Id. Approximately one week later, the group molded the
idea into a song during a recording session with an American gospel singer
named Billy Preston. Id.
143
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ing."60 The court determined that the plaintiffs song, "He's
So Fine," was so widely known that Harrison must have had
heard it at some point.6' Coupled with the fact that "He's So
Fine" was so well known was the strong musical similarity
between the songs .6  The songs not only shared two similar
melodic motives, but "My Sweet Lord" also repeated those
motives in nearly the exact same pattern as did "He's So
Fine."63 As for the subconscious copying charge, the court
noted that Harrison must have known subconsciously that
the musical expression in "He's So Fine" had been successful
in terms of popularity with the public.64
While the Selle decision demonstrates that the copying
prong requires proof of minimal access in addition to striking
similarity,65 in some instances, such as with music of wide
popularity, similarity can be so striking as to render proof of
access nominal or even unnecessary because it can be in-
ferred.66 It is unclear from the case law whether the inverse,
60. Id. at 180-81.
61. Bright Tunes, 420 F. Supp. at 180-81. Bright Tunes was not the first
time subconscious copying appeared in the context of music infringement cases.
It also arose in a 1924 case involving the famous American songwriter Jerome
Kern, wherein Judge Learned Hand wrote: "Everything registers somewhere in
our memories, and no one can tell what may evoke it." Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dil-
lingham, 298 F. 145, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
62. Bright Tunes, 420 F. Supp. at 180.
63. Id. at 178. The court noted, "[wihile neither motif is novel, the four
repetitions of [the A motif], followed by four repetitions of [the B motifl, is a
highly unique pattern." Id.
64. Id. at 180-81. Judge Owen concluded the following:
I conclude that the composer in seeking musical materials to clothe his
thoughts, was working with various possibilities. As he tried this pos-
sibility and that, there came to the surface of his mind a particular
combination that pleased him as being one he felt would be appealing
to a prospective listener; in other words, that this combination of
sounds would work. Why? Because his subconscious knew it already
had worked in a song his conscious mind did not remember. Having
arrived at this pleasing combination of sounds, the recording was
made, the lead sheet prepared for copyright and the song became an
enormous success. Did Harrison deliberately use the music of He's So
Fine? I do not believe he did so deliberately. Nevertheless, it is clear
that My Sweet Lord is the very same song as He's So Fine with differ-
ent words, and Harrison had access to He's So Fine. This is, under the
law, infringement of copyright, and is no less so even though subcon-
sciously accomplished.
Id.
65. Selle, 741 F.2d at 905.
66. JOYCE ET AL., supra note 14, at 681-82 (discussing Bouchat v. Baltimore
Ravens, Inc., 241 F.3d 350 (4th Cir. 2001); Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061
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that a strong case of access would require a lesser showing of
striking similarity, is true." This would, however, appear to
violate Arnstein's rule that "if there are no similarities, no
amount of evidence of access will suffice to prove copying."68
2. The Improper Appropriation Prong
As Arnstein notes, only after the copying prong is estab-
lished "does there arise the second issue, that of illicit copying
(unlawful appropriation)."69 This second prong requires the
plaintiff to show that the defendant improperly appropriated
the plaintiffs music.7" Requiring proof of improper appro-
priation is important because there can also be non-illicit, or
permissible, copying.7 Thus, adequate proof of copying is not
enough to win a case.72 Arnstein holds that expert testimony
and "dissection" are irrelevant during the improper appro-
priation inquiry.73 The test suggested by the court is "the re-
sponse of the ordinary lay hearer.7
4
The lay listener test did not originate with Arnstein,
however, but rather had been used in music infringement
cases for several years.75 In a 1915 case, the judge noted that
he was "[slitting for the moment as the uninformed and tech-
nically untutored public... ."76 In an earlier case involving
Ira Arnstein,77 the court wrote that the appropriation must be
"substantial and capable of apprehension by the music loving
(2d Cir. 1988)).
67. See generally id. at 682-83. I believe that it would be very dangerous for
courts to require a lesser showing of striking similarity based on a strong case of
access in music cases. This could open the door for plaintiffs who have very
well-known songs to claim infringement by defendants whose songs may not
necessarily be very similar.
68. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
69. Id.
70. Id. The opinion seems to use the terms "illicit copying," "improper ap-
propriation," and "unlawful appropriation" interchangeably.
71. Id. at 472.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 468. Although the court does not explicitly define the term, dis-
section is probably best understood as picking apart the individual elements of
musical compositions in a manner resembling the subtractive approach, dis-
cussed infra in text accompanying notes 91-92.
74. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468. This test is frequently referred to more gen-
erally as the "audience" test. See LEAFFER, supra note 6, at 393, 395.
75. See generally Sherman, supra note 34, at 93-94.
76. Boosey v. Empire Music Co., Inc., 224 F. 646, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
77. Arnstein v. Broad. Music, Inc., 137 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1943).
145
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public" to justify a finding of infringement."'
Arnstein v. Porter's innovation is that it casts the founda-
tion for the lay listener test as primarily an economic consid-
eration:
The plaintiffs legally protected interest is not, as such, his
reputation as a musician but his interest in the potential
financial returns from his compositions which derive from
the lay public's approbation of his efforts. The question,
therefore, is whether defendant took from plaintiffs works
so much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners,
who comprise the audience for whom such popular music
is composed, that defendant wrongfully appropriated
something which belongs to the plaintiff.
79
In other words, the court places the primary value of a
piece of music in the portion that makes it popular with, or at
least recognizable to, the public.
Under Arnstein's logic, improper appropriation occurs
where the defendant has appropriated the portion of the
plaintiffs music that made it pleasing and popular. One
commentator has described this as the "catchy part" of the
music.8 0 This is essentially a quasi-unjust enrichment ra-
tionale based on whether the defendant has appropriated the
catchy part of the music. The Arnstein court notes the impor-
tance of this economic consideration, stating that "[t]he im-
pression made on the refined ears of musical experts or their
views as to the musical excellence of plaintiffs or defendant's
works are utterly immaterial on the issue of misappropria-
tion."1
Ultimately, Arnstein does not completely bar expert tes-
timony, but instead limits it to "assist in determining the re-
actions of lay auditors" 2 because expert testimony is "utterly
immaterial on the issue of misappropriation." 3
Thus, as generally applied, the improper appropriation
prong includes two elements. First, the plaintiff must show
that the defendant appropriated protected expression from
78. Id. at 412.
79. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d at 473 (footnote omitted).
80. Aaron Keyt, An Improved Framework for Music Plagiarism Litigation,
76 CAL. L. REV. 421, 439-40 (1988).
81. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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the plaintiffs copyrighted work.84 Second, the plaintiff must
show that there is substantial similarity between the defen-
dant's work and the plaintiffs protected expression. 5
3. The Broader Application of Improper Appropriation
and Approaches to Determining Whether it Has
Occurred
In addition to Arnstein's lay listener approach and lim-
ited use of expert testimony, several other methods have been
developed to determine improper appropriation. 6 One such
method, discussed in Part II.C, is the "total concept and feel"
approach. The Ninth Circuit developed this approach 7 and it
was brought to prominence by Sid & Marty Krofft Television
Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp."8 The Krofft court
rooted its approach directly in the idea-expression dichot-
omy89 and provided a new way of approaching the lay listener
test.90
Another important method for determining improper ap-
propriation is known as the subtractive approach. The sub-
tractive approach involves analyzing the allegedly infringed
work to determine which of its elements are protected by
copyright and which are not.91 After the unprotected ele-
ments are removed from consideration, the trier of fact then
determines whether there is significant similarity between
the allegedly infringing work and what remains of the alleg-
edly infringed work, namely the protectible elements.92 The
permissible copying described by Arnstein occurs where there
is similarity between the defendant's work and nonprotectible
elements of the plaintiffs work.93
A further concept of which courts must be mindful is the
idea-expression dichotomy essential to copyright law. The
84. JOYCE ET AL., supra note 14, at 668.
85. Id. at 668-69.
86. See Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
87. Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir.
1970).
88. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157 (9thCir. 1977). See also discussion infra Part II.C.
89. See infra text accompanying notes 94-101 for a discussion of the idea-
expression dichotomy.
90. See Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1165.
91. JOYCE ET AL., supra note 14, at 686.
92. Id.
93. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
147
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idea-expression dichotomy is embodied in the theory that,
while ideas themselves are not copyrightable, the expression
of those ideas is copyrightable.94 This creates an essential
tension in copyright law between idea and expression." To
respond to allegations of improper appropriation, a defendant
will often argue that the portions of the plaintiffs work that
the defendant appropriated were not protectible expression.96
The idea-expression dichotomy was addressed by the
United States Supreme Court as early as 1880 in Baker v.
Selden.97 In that case, Charles Selden created a unique sys-
tem of bookkeeping and published charts and tables in a book
that explained how to implement the system.98  Baker pub-
lished a book that contained a similar system and was ac-
cused of infringement by Selden's heir.99 The Court held that
Selden could protect the expression of his system as it was
found in the book he published, but he could not protect the
system itself from being used or discussed by others. 00 The
Supreme Court's decision ultimately means that copyright
protection cannot be granted to the ideas underlying certain
systems. 1o
Finally, nonprotectible elements can also include mate-
rial traceable to scnes et faire. °2 Although not a music in-
fringement case, Alexander v. Haley,1°3 involving writer Alex
Haley, defines scnes & faire in the following manner: "These
are incidents, characters or settings which are as a practical
matter indispensable, or at least standard, in the treatment
of a given topic.... Nobody writes books of purely original
94. See JOYCE ET AL., supra note 14, at 118; LEAFFER, supra note 6, at 77-
79.
95. The idea-expression dichotomy is codified in the 1976 Copyright Act,
which states: "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of au-
thorship extend to any idea ... regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
96. JOYCE ET AL., supra note 14, at 668. In other words, the defendant
would be asserting that the portions allegedly appropriated were ideas rather
than expression.
97. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880).
98. id. at 99-100
99. Id. at 100.
100. Id. at 104-05. "But there is a clear distinction between the book, as
such, and the art which it is intended to illustrate." Id. at 102.
101. See generally LEAFFER, supra note 6, at 81.
102. See discussion infra Part IV (noting that these elements can also be
grafted onto music).
103. Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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content."1 04
Music written in the tonal system 10 5 contains its own
scones e faire and "cliches" that must be taken into account in
music plagiarism cases. 10 6 A recent case involving pop singer
Mariah Carey discusses scnes & faire in the context of mu-
sic.'017 The plaintiff alleged that Carey's "Thank God I Found
You" infringed the song "One of Those Love Songs," written
by the plaintiffs and recorded by the group Xscape.' 0 8 The
district court held that "One of Those Love Songs" could not
be protected by copyright because the elements allegedly in-
fringed were scnes e faire elements.10 9 The court's sc nes e
faire analysis was based on the premise that the pitch se-
quence of "One of Those Love Songs" had a similar pitch se-
quence to portions of the folk song "For He's a Jolly Good Fel-
low." ' 0 On appeal, the plaintiffs contested the scnes d faire
analysis and the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the dis-
trict court."'
C. The Krofft Approach
Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v.
McDonald's Corp."' represents the second key approach to
copyright infringement. Krofft was a suit against McDonald's
by the owners of the rights to the children's television show
"H.R. Pufnstuf.""1 3  The plaintiffs claimed that McDonald's
104. Id. at 45 (citing Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87,
91 (2d Cir. 1976)).
105. The tonal system is a hierarchical system of pitches and harmony. See
discussion infra Part IV.C.
106. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
107. Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 849-50 (9th Cir. 2004). The scones
faire concept was also raised in a 1996 case involving pop star Michael Jackson.
Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1216 (9th Cir. 1996).
108. Swirsky, 376 F.3d at 843-44.
109. Id. at 849-50.
110. Id. at 850. The problems with relying solely on comparison of melodies
will be discussed infra Part IV.C.
111. Id. at 853. Subsequent to the remand, there has been no reported deci-
sion from the district court, nor has there been any news of a settlement. The
Ninth Circuit did, however, release an amended opinion. Swirsky v. Carey,
2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 17969 (9th Cir. Aug. 24, 2004). The amended opinion
contains no significant changes.
112. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157 (9thCir. 1977).
113. Id. at 1160. "H.R. Pufnstuf" was a children's television show that aired
on NBC from 1969-1971 and on ABC from 1972-1974. HAL ERICKSON, SID AND
MARTY KROFFT 17 (1998). The show featured two human characters and sev-
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characters in the "McDonaldland" television commercials in-
fringed H.R. Pufnstuf characters."4 Although not a music in-
fringement case, the test devised by the Krofft court has been
influential in many subsequent music infringement actions.'15
According to the court, the real task in an infringement action
"is to determine whether there has been copying of the ex-
pression of an idea rather than just the idea itself.""' 6 Thus,
the court determined that copyright infringement actions re-
quire two distinct tests: an extrinsic test and an intrinsic
test."7 The Krofft opinion also brought the "total concept and
feel" approach to prominence.""
1. The Extrinsic and Intrinsic Tests
Krofft created a bifurcated extrinsic-intrinsic approach
rooted in the idea-expression dichotomy." 9 The Ninth Circuit
was careful to note that it was not resurrecting the Arnstein
approach in creating its bifurcated infringement test. 21
Rather, the court stated: "We believe that the court in Arn-
stein was alluding to the idea-expression dichotomy which we
make explicit today. "121
As with all infringement tests, Krofft requires ownership
of a valid copyright and access to the copyrighted work. 22
The focal inquiry of the extrinsic test is whether there is sub-
stantial similarity of ideas between the plaintiffs work and
the defendant's work. 23 The test is extrinsic "because it de-
eral costumed characters and was set on the Living Island, where everything
was alive. Id. at 17-19. H.R. Pufnstuf, a friendly dragon, was the mayor of the
Living Island. Id. at 17. The show has been criticized by some commentators as
having a drug-culture subtext. See id. at 32-33.
114. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1160.
115. See, e.g., Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1987) (involving
film composer John Williams's "E.T." film score); Dawson v. Hinshaw Music,
905 F.2d 731 (4th Cir. 1990) (involving two choral arrangements of the spiritual
"Ezekiel Saw De Wheel"); Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477 (9th
Cir. 2000) (involving alleged infringement by Michael Bolton of the Isley Broth-
ers' song "Love is a Wonderful Thing").
116. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1163.
117. Id. at 1164.
118. See discussion infra Part I.C.2.
119. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1163. Copyright protection is only extended to ex-
pression of ideas, not the ideas themselves. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,
217-18 (1954); supra text accompanying notes 94-101.
120. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1165 n.7.
121. Id. at 1165.
122. Id. at 1164.
123. Id. The Krofft test has been criticized for using the terminology "sub-
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pends not on the responses of the trier of fact, but on specific
criteria which can be listed and analyzed," such as the type of
artwork involved, materials used, and the subject matter.124
Expert testimony and analytic dissection are allowed for de-
termining similarity. 125 Thus, the plaintiff will utilize an ex-
pert to point out the similarities between the plaintiffs work
and the allegedly infringing work by the defendant. 126
Once the plaintiff demonstrates substantial similarity of
ideas, the trier of fact must determine whether there is sub-
stantial similarity in the expression of those ideas so as to
constitute infringement.'27 This inquiry is known as the in-
trinsic test.128 Determination under the intrinsic test is not to
be made by analytic dissection or expert testimony, but
rather, by "the response of the ordinary reasonable person"
using the "total concept and feel" approach. 29 Krofft also ap-
pears to suggest that the ordinary reasonable person ap-
proach be geared toward a more specific, rather than a gen-
eral or lay audience. 13
2. The "Total Concept and Feel" Approach
Krofft is most notable for its application of the "total con-
cept and feel" approach to the intrinsic, or improper appro-
priation, prong of copyright infringement.' 3 ' This approach
involves looking not at each protectible element individually,
but rather the total concept and feel of the allegedly infringed
stantial similarity" confusingly because it applies the term both to actual copy-
ing and improper appropriation. See Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d
131, 140 (2d Cir. 1992). One commentator suggests the first prong be referred
to as "probative similarity," while the second prong remains an inquiry into
"substantial similarity." See Alan Latman, "Probative Similarity" as Proof of
Copying: Toward Dispelling Some Myths in Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 1187 (1990).
124. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164.
125. Id.
126. See generally id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1166 ("The present case demands an even more in-
trinsic determination because both plaintiffs' and defendants' works are di-
rected to an audience of children."). Later, the court noted: "We do not believe
that the ordinary reasonable person, let alone a child, viewing these works will
even notice that Pufnstuf is wearing a cummerbund while Mayor McCheese is
wearing a diplomat's sash." Id. at 1167 (emphasis added).
131. JOYCE ET AL., supra note 14, at 688.
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work. 132 Next, a determination is made by the trier of fact as
to whether the defendant's work is substantially similar to
the total concept and feel of the plaintiffs work. 133 In Krofft,
the court viewed samples of both Pufnstuf characters and
McDonaldland characters and found that the McDonaldland
characters were substantially similar to the Pufnstuf charac-
ters. 134 The court ruled that the defendants had "captured the
'total concept and feel' of the Pufnstuf show." 35
D. Further Development of the Lay Listener Test
The ordinary lay listener test for improper appropriation
was melded with the Krofft approach by the Fourth Circuit in
Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc. 36 Dawson involved alleged
infringement of a musical arrangement of the spiritual
131
"Ezekiel Saw De Wheel."1 38  The court determined that the
ordinary listener test should be oriented "to the works' in-
tended audience, permitting an ordinary lay observer charac-
terization of the test only where the lay public fairly repre-
sents the works' intended audience." 39 In this case, because
the work at issue was a choral arrangement of a spiritual, the
intended audience was deemed to be choral directors who
were in the position of choosing one of the arrangements of
"Ezekiel Saw De Wheel" over the other. 140  The court noted
that tailoring the observer test to the intended audience of
the works in question harmonized the Arnstein and Krofft ap-
proaches because "the Krofft court believed that the perspec-
tive of the specific audience for the products ... was the rele-
132. Id.
133. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1167.
134. Id. at 1167.
135. Id.
136. Dawson v. Hinshaw Music, Inc., 905 F.2d 731 (4th Cir. 1990).
137. The term spiritual is most often used to refer to African American reli-
gious folk songs of the nineteenth century. THE NEW HARVARD DICTIONARY OF
MUSIC 804 (Don Michael Randel ed., 1986).
138. See Dawson, 905 F.2d at 732.
139. Id. at 733 (emphasis in original). The court continued:
[M e read [Arnstein's] logic to require that where the intended audience
is significantly, more specialized than the pool of lay listeners, the reac-
tion of the intended audience would be the relevant inquiry. In light of
the copyright law's purpose of protecting a creator's market, we think it
sensible to embrace Arnstein's command that the ultimate comparison
of the works at issue be oriented towards the works' intended audience.
Id. at 734.
140. Id. at 737-38.
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vant perspective for the ordinary observer test.""4 Unlike
Krofft, however, and more akin to Arnstein, Dawson allowed
expert testimony "from those who possess expertise with ref-
erence to the tastes and perceptions of the intended audi-
ence."
142
E. Sc~nes A Faire in Music: A Basic Primer on Tonal Music
Theory
Because scenes e faire in music is a central element of the
analysis presented in Part IV.C of this comment, a back-
ground primer on tonal music theory may be helpful to the
reader. Although there are a number of compositional sys-
tems available to composers, such as the dodecaphonicism
4 1
developed by Arnold Schoenberg" M or the octatonicism
45
found in much of the music of B6la Bart6k,146 most of the mu-
sic that finds its way into music plagiarism cases is based on
the tonal system.1
47
Tonal music is composed in a system with a hierarchical
structure where pitches and harmony relate to one another. 48
141. Id. at 735.
142. Id. at 736. Courts were cautioned to be hesitant to find that the lay pub-
lic is not a work's intended audience and that they should only depart from the
lay characterization where the intended audience has "specialized expertise."
Id. at 737. This "specialized expertise" must "go beyond mere differences in
taste and instead must rise to the level of the possession of knowledge that the
lay public lacks." Id. See also supra note 139.
143. This system is meant to negate a sense of tonal center by utilizing all
twelve possible pitches. STEFAN KOSTKA & DOROTHY PAYNE, TONAL HARMONY
535 (4th ed. 2000).
144. Arnold Schoenberg (1874-1951) was an Austrian-born composer, music
theorist, writer, and teacher who later came to America and taught both at the
University of Southern California and the University of California, Los Angeles.
BAKER, supra note 18, at 1629-31. He is credited with creating the twelve-tone
system of composition, discussed supra note 143. Id. at 1629.
145. Octatonic music is based on an eight note scale that alternates half
steps (adjacent keys on the piano keyboard) and whole steps (the distance be-
tween every other key on the piano keyboard). See KOSTKA & PAYNE, supra
note 143, at 497-98.
146. Bla Bart6k (1881-1945) was a Hungarian composer who made enor-
mous contributions to the study of folk music in Eastern Europe. BAKER, supra
note 18, at 115-16 ("Indeed, he regarded his analytical studies of popular melo-
dies as his most important contribution to music.").
147. Maureen Baker, La[w]-A Note to Follow So: Have We Forgotten the
Federal Rules of Evidence in Music Plagiarism Cases?, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1583,
1628 (1992).
148. See generally KOSTKA & PAYNE, supra note 143, at xii-xiv.
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Tonal music is rooted in a particular key, or tonal center. 149
Each key is served by a particular scale that represents the
pitches available in that key.' Scales are built in patterns of
half steps (directly adjacent keys on the piano keyboard) and
whole steps (the distance between every other key on the pi-
ano).'51 For example, the key of C Major is centered on the
pitch 'C' and begins and ends on 'C.' This distance is called
an octave because it spans eight notes. Each note in the scale
is given a number, or a scale degree.'52 Scale degree 1 is the
tonal center and is appropriately labeled the "tonic."
Example 1:
--P
A A A A A A A A
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1
Upon each note in the scale, a chord can be constructed, the
most basic chord being a triad. 53 Triads are built and identi-
fied by their root, or the bottom note of the triad.' As can be
seen in Example 2, only certain pitches make up certain tri-
ads, limiting the number of pitches that can be used melodi-
cally in conjunction with any particular chord. Although by
149. Id. at xii-xiii.
150. Of course, composers may use pitches that do not fall in this set of
pitches.
151. See HUGH M. MILLER, INTRODUCTION TO MUSIC: A GUIDE TO GOOD
LISTENING 227 (1971).
152. See KOSTKA & PAYNE, supra note 143, at 7.
153. The triad is by no means the only type of chord construction available.
Another common type of chord is the seventh chord, which contains four notes,
the fourth of which is the interval of a seventh above the root, or lowest note, of
the chord.
154. Triads constructed in this manner are said to be in "root position." Tri-
ads can also be inverted, which is achieved by successively removing the bottom
note of the triad and placing it "on top" of the remaining pitches. For example,
a first inversion C Major triad looks like this:
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no means is it impossible or unpleasant to harmonize 155 a par-
ticular chord with a "non-chord tone," the most harmonically
stable sounds will be created by using pitches contained in
the chord.15
6
In traditional analysis,'57 each of these chords is given a
roman numeral designation. The roman numeral corre-
sponds to the root of the chord, which in turn corresponds to
the scale degree of the root. For example, the chord built on
C, consisting of the notes C-E-G, is a C Major triad and is
given the roman numeral designation "I." Capital roman
numerals are often used to indicate major triads and lower
case roman numerals represent minor triads. 158 These chords
are also given names that generally reflect their importance
in the overall tonal hierarchy. The three most important
chords in order of importance are the Tonic (I), the Dominant
(V), and the Subdominant (IV).159
Example 2:160
ii iii IV V vi vii °  1
Tonal music tends to be composed in phrases and periods,
which are analogous to sentences and paragraphs.1 6 ' The
construction of the phrases lends structure to the whole of the
155. To harmonize means using pitches in conjunction with chords.
156. Pleasant sounds are often described as consonant, while unpleasant
sounds are described as dissonant. See KOSTKA & PAYNE, supra note 143, at 24
(emphasis added).
157. Traditional analysis is that which is taught in music theory courses at
most colleges and universities across the country.
158. This practice varies from academic institution to institution as well as
from theorist to theorist. I was taught the lowercase-uppercase usage as an un-
dergraduate, but strictly made use of uppercase roman numerals as a graduate
student. The reason for choosing one usage over the other is often a choice
based on one's philosophy about harmonic function and is beyond the scope of
this comment.
159. See MILLER, supra note 151, at 30. The other chord name designations
are: Supertonic (ii); Mediant (iii); Submediant (vi); and Leading Tone (vii*).
160. It should be noted that the chord bearing the designation vii ° is a dimin-
ished chord, which is neither major nor minor.
161. See MILLER, supra note 151, at 80.
155
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musical work. The end of a phrase is generally signified by a
cadence.162 Two of the most common cadences in tonal music
are the "whole" cadence and the "half' cadence. The whole
cadence is most analogous to a period,163 signifying a relaxed
moment in the music. This is because the music has returned
to the Tonic harmony (I), or the tonal center of the piece.6
The half cadence, also called an open cadence, is most analo-
gous to a semi-colon, 165 indicating that there is material to fol-
low that will make the phrase complete. Half cadences come
to a rest on the Dominant harmony (V).166
Furthermore, in the hierarchy of the tonal system, cer-
tain chords have a tendency to move to certain other chords.
This is due also to the tendencies of the notes which are
commonly used to harmonize certain chords.' 67 Analysis of
hundreds of years of tonal music has revealed that composers
very frequently follow these tendencies.161 In fact, Leonard
Meyer, writing primarily about classical music, describes
these tendencies in terms of listener expectations.' 69  He
writes that, by listening to music, listeners have been condi-
tioned to expect certain sounds and/or patterns to follow other
sounds and/or patterns.7 ' Placing the discussion in terms of
probability, Meyer notes:
Musical events take place in a world of stylistic probabil-
ity. If we hear only a single tone, a great number of dif-
ferent tones could follow it with equal probability. If a se-
162. A cadence is a "harmonic goal, specifically the chords used at the goal."
KOSTKA & PAYNE, supra note 143, at 156.
163. MILLER, supra note 151,.at 80-81.
164. See KOSTKA & PAYNE, supra note 143, at 156-57. Note that Kostka &
Payne refer to the whole cadence as an "authentic" cadence. Id.
165. MILLER, supra note 151, at 80.
166. See KoSTKA & PAYNE, supra note 143, at 159.
167. For example, a dominant (V) chord is often harmonized by the note rep-
resented by scale degree 7. This note is commonly called the "leading tone" be-
cause it leads to the tonic. Since scale degree 7 generally moves to scale degree
1, the number of chords that can be used to follow the dominant (V) chord is
limited. This is also the reason the dominant chord tends most often to move to
the tonic chord. This concept is generally referred to as "voice leading." See
generally id. at 75.
168. For an excellent discussion of tonal harmonic movement, see KOSTKA &
PAYNE, supra note 143, ch. 5. The Kostka & Payne text also has a very useful
chart detailing typical chord movement in the tonal setting. KOSTKA & PAYNE,
supra note 143, at 116.
169. LEONARD MEYER, MUSIC, THE ARTS, AND IDEAS 7-16 (1967).
170. See generally id. at 7-21.
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quence of two tones is heard, the number of probable con-
sequent tones is somewhat reduced-how much depends
upon the tones chosen and the stylistic context-and
hence the probability of the remaining alternatives is
somewhat increased. As more tones are added and conse-
quently more relationships between tones established, the
probabilities of a particular goal become increased.171
The above discussion, while presenting a very simplified
introduction to tonal harmony, progresses from single pitches
to harmonic movement. What makes music interesting is the
manner in which composers use the tendencies of the tonal
system to create unique and creative pieces of music. Com-
posers can create new chords, borrow chords from other keys,
or disperse the notes they use in interesting ways among the
instruments for which they compose. This type of deviation
from expectations is perhaps the point at which musical
scnes et faire become expression, a point explored in Part
IV.C.
III. THE INHERENT PROBLEMS WITH THE ARNSTEIN AND
KROFFT APPROACHES
There are two problems with the Arnstein and Krofft
tests to music infringement. First, music's unique nature
makes it difficult to draw a distinction between idea and ex-
pression.17 2 Krofft itself noted that there is a difficulty in at-
tempting "to distill the unprotected idea from the protected
expression."173 The idea-expression dichotomy, central to
copyright law, is not easily applied to the copyright analysis
of music. Popular music, 174 the most frequent subject of copy-
right disputes, is especially problematic when considering
idea and expression. For instance, popular music is primarily
written in the tonal system,175 which, as discussed in Part
171. Id. at 27.
172. It is, however, necessary to recognize some distinction between idea and
expression. Otherwise, no musical compositions would be copyrightable because
they would be subject to the merger doctrine. The merger doctrine holds that
when idea and expression cannot be separated, they merge and copyright pro-
tection is unavailable. See LEAFFER, supra note 6, at 81-82.
173. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1163 (9thCir. 1977).
174. I am using the term "popular music" broadly to include many genres
such as Rock & Roll, Gospel, Country, Film Scores, and Showtunes.
175. KOsTKA & PAYNE, supra note 143, at xii.
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II.E, is a hierarchical structure of chords and pitches. Be-
cause there are a finite number of viable possibilities of pitch
and harmonic relationships, the tonal system is somewhat
limited. Further, since the tonal system is built on a hierar-
chy where certain chords and pitches are more important
than other chords and pitches, there are certain prevalent
patterns and tendencies that are common to virtually all mu-
sical works composed in the tonal system.176 These patterns
and tendencies can be described as the ideas, or scnes e faire,
in a musical work. 177 It is the manner in which the composer
makes use of these ideas in constructing a piece of music that
constitutes expression. However, because the distinction be-
tween idea and expression in music is not as simple as it
seems, the expert testimony of music theorists is important in
music infringement litigation.
The second, and perhaps more serious, problem with the
Arnstein and Krofft approaches is that expert testimony is
limited, or even proscribed, where it is most needed: during
the improper appropriation inquiry.178  Musical experts are
trained to analyze music by examining the way chords and
pitches interact.1 79 They are knowledgeable about the pat-
terns and tendencies of tonal music. This expertise can be in-
valuable in a music infringement suit because the expert can
examine the two pieces of music at issue to determine the ac-
tual level of their similarity. The expert can comment on eve-
rything from melodic similarity to similarity of chord progres-
sions to overall pattern similarity. The expert can also
determine whether the similarity occurs because of infringe-
ment of another's music (infringement of expression), or
whether the similarity occurs because both pieces of music
have been written within the tonal system and are subject to
its constraints and tendencies (merely similarity of idea).
Unfortunately, the expert is generally proscribed from
commenting on the deeper nature of the similarities between
the plaintiffs and defendant's musical works because this in-
176. See supra notes 166-70 and accompanying text.
177. For a more detailed discussion of musical "ideas," see discussion infra
Part TV.C.
178. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
179. Although most often a pop song is not written, or often even notated, in
the same manner as a piece of traditional classical music, the methods of musi-
cal analysis used to understand the two works are quite similar. See generally
KOSTKA & PAYNE, supra note 143, at xii-xiii.
158 [Vol: 46
2005] A NEW TEST FOR MUSIC INFRINGEMENT
quiry happens during the improper appropriation stage of in-
fringement cases. Arnstein allows an expert to comment only
on how a lay listener might experience a musical work, but
does not allow the expert to discuss improper appropriation
directly.' In contrast, Krofft eradicates expert testimony en-
tirely from its second, improper appropriation, prong."8 ' Al-
lowing expert testimony in the copying stage of music in-
fringement cases but not in the improper appropriation stage
is, quite simply, counterproductive. After an expert reveals
what is similar about the musical works during the first
stage, the trier of fact is left on his or her own in the second
stage to make a determination as to whether the defendant
improperly appropriated protected expression from the plain-
tiffs work."8 2 The trier of fact is also ostensibly supposed to
forget about the expert's testimony during this second stage
and focus on how a lay listener would perceive the two pieces
of music."8 3 Because triers of fact often lack musical training,
especially the sort necessary to make a meaningful compari-
son of musical works, their decisions may not reflect whether
the two works at issue have any substantial similarity of pro-
tected expression.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. A Basic Comparison of the Arnstein and Krofft
Approaches
Although the Krofft approach differs somewhat from the
Arnstein approach, both are still comparable in several re-
spects. The extrinsic test set forth by Krofft is akin to the
copying prong of the Arnstein approach.18 4 As in the Arnstein
approach, "analytic dissection and expert testimony are ap-
propriate"8 8 for determining similarity. The Krofft intrinsic
test is similar to the improper appropriation prong of Arn-
180. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
181. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977).
182. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
183. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
184. Recall that Arnstein requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the de-
fendant copied from plaintiffs copyrighted work. Id.
185. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164. Arnstein also allows expert testimony and dis-
section in the copying prong. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
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stein.186
In terms of expert testimony, however, Krofft and Arn-
stein differ. Arnstein allows expert testimony as to how a lay
listener might perceive a musical work, but not directly with
respect to improper appropriation. In contrast, Krofft forbids
expert testimony in its second, intrinsic, prong.187 Krofft also
seems to indicate that the ordinary lay observer test should
be refined to include the intended audience for the work at is-
sue. 188
B. The Problems of Limited Expert Testimony and the Lay
Listener Test
Both Arnstein and Krofft, by attempting to set forth re-
fined tests for infringement, have done more harm than good
for music infringement jurisprudence. First, both approaches
dramatically limit the type of testimony allowed by expert
witnesses. 89 Second, both Arnstein and Krofft place a lay lis-
tener, either the judge or a jury, in the position of having to
make a determination of substantial similarity between two
musical works,1 90 even though judges and juries generally
lack the musical knowledge to make such a meaningful de-
termination. Consequently, Krofft's attempt to make the in-
fringement analysis reflect the idea-expression dichotomy
gives rise to the possibility that lay listeners will mistake
scnes d faire elements in music as evidence of improper ap-
propriation. This final problem would not be so troublesome
if expert testimony were allowed on the issue of improper ap-
propriation. Through use of the Krofft "total concept and feel"
approach, experts can identify whether substantial similarity
186. Under the Arnstein approach, once a plaintiff successfully demonstrates
copying, the plaintiff must also show that defendant's copying constituted im-
proper appropriation. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
187. See Der Manuelian, supra note 49, at 138.
188. See Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1166. Arnstein may also have indicated a tailor-
ing of the lay listener test by using the phrase "lay listeners, who comprise the
audience for whom such popular music is composed." Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473.
Arnstein is certainly not as explicit as Krofft regarding tailoring the approach,
however.
189. Arnstein, as noted, allows expert testimony in both prongs of its test, but
limits the testimony in the second prong solely to comments on how a lay lis-
tener might perceive the two pieces of music. See discussion supra Part II.B.
Krofft completely removes expert testimony from its second prong. See discus-
sion supra Part II.C.
190. See discussion supra Part II.
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is present between the allegedly infringing musical work and
the plaintiffs musical work.
One of the most frequent criticisms of both the Arnstein
and Krofft approaches is that they proscribe expert testimony
where it is needed most.1 91 During the improper appropria-
tion prong, Arnstein allows an expert to comment on how a
lay listener might hear the two pieces of music at issue in the
case, but not as to improper appropriation itself.'92 Krofft en-
tirely disallows expert testimony during its intrinsic prong.1
93
Therefore, after the expert presents testimony as to whether
elements of the plaintiffs music have been copied by the de-
fendant, the trier of fact must make a decision without the
aid of the expert as to whether the defendant has improperly
appropriated from the plaintiffs music.
Judge Clark explained the flaws in the majority approach
in Arnstein in his dissenting opinion. 94 He took issue both
with the court's two-pronged approach to infringement and
with using the lay listener test at the expense of expert guid-
ance:
I find nowhere any suggestion of two steps in adjudication
of this issue, one of finding copying which may be ap-
proached with musical intelligence and assistance of ex-
perts, and another that of illicit copying which must be
approached with complete ignorance; nor do I see how ra-
tionally there can be any such difference, even if a jury-
the now chosen instrument of musical detection-could be
expected to separate those issues and the evidence accord-
ingly. If there is actual copying, it is actionable, and there
are no degrees; what we are dealing with is the claim of
similarities sufficient to justify the inference of copying.
This is a single deduction to be made intelligently, not two
with the dominating one to be made blindly.'95
Thus, Judge Clark immediately saw the problem with barring
expert testimony during the illicit copying inquiry.
Although Arnstein does not allow the expert to comment
on the issue of improper appropriation, 96 the expert can offer
an opinion as to how a lay listener might hear the two pieces
191. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 21, at 120.
192. See Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468; see also discussion supra Part I.B.2.
193. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164. See also discussion supra Part II.C.1.
194. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 475-80 (Clark, J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 476 n.1 (Clark, J., dissenting).
196. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
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of music at issue in the case.' 97 However, expert analysis of
how a lay listener might hear the music at issue is also prob-
lematic. Experts in music infringement cases often have sev-
eral years of musical training and practical experience. In
addition, many experts are music theorists who devote their
lives to analyzing and understanding music. 198 As a result,
the expert's ear is acutely attuned to the inner complexities of
music.' 99 In contrast, the average listener, especially a lis-
tener whose regular musical listening includes music of the
popular genres, generally does not listen to music with this
level of sophistication. One commentator has highlighted the
trouble with asking such an expert to comment about how a
lay listener would perceive a piece of music: "Whether an ex-
pert, highly educated in the field of music theory, analysis,
and history, can in fact hear again as a lay listener is specula-
tive at best." 00
Furthermore, whether judges and juries can make a dis-
tinction of improper appropriation by acting as lay listeners is
even more suspect.2°' Judges and juries are unlikely to have
a high degree of musical training, let alone the tools to distin-
guish whether a defendant's copying constitutes improper ap-
propriation of a plaintiffs protected expression. °2 Although
language skills such as reading and writing are used and re-
fined through continuous practice, the aural skills necessary
to making a meaningful determination of similarity in the
197. Id.
198. The plaintiffs expert in Selle v. Gibb exemplifies the typical expert.
Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1984). At the time of trial, Dr. Arrand Par-
sons was a music professor at Northwestern University. Id. at 899. He wrote
program notes for both the Chicago Symphony and the New Orleans Symphony,
and also wrote about music theory. Id.
199. Experts used in music infringement cases undoubtedly have under-
graduate and graduate degrees in music. Students who obtain formal music
education such as this are expected to develop a refined ear to hear the inner
complexities of music. In fact, most undergraduate music majors are required
to take at least two years each of both music theory and aural skills.
200. Der Manuelian, supra note 49, at 133
201. Raphael Metzger, Name That Tune: A Proposal for an Intrinsic Test of
vlusicaiPlugiwism, 34 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCA 139,151-52 (1987).
202. One commentator notes that there is an inconsistency between the use
of expert testimony in computer cases and music cases. Debra Presti Brent, The
Successful Musical Copyright Infringement Suit: The Impossible Dream, 7 U.
MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 229, 246 (1990) ("For example, courts have not
hesitated to admit expert testimony when similarity between computer pro-
grams is at issue. Yet, these same courts are still relying on the lay listener test
in music copyright cases.").
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musical context go largely undeveloped in most people.2 °3
In his dissent, Judge Clark also took issue with the in-
adequacy of asking untrained laypersons to make decisions
about illicit copying in music, describing the Arnstein decision
as exhibiting an "anti-intellectual and book burning" philoso-
phy.2"4 Building on the comments made by Judge Clark, one
commentator has observed:
If plaintiffs "striking similarity" proof (required absent
access) is a technical issue and therefore requires expert
guidance, does not the jury need expert guidance just as
much (if not even more) when it reaches the heart of the
analytic journey-at the moment where it must consider
the actual "illicitness" level of the similarity? Surely this
must be so. 205
Finally, by barring expert testimony in assessing the im-
proper appropriation prong, judges or juries must essentially
forget what the expert has told them during the copying in-
quiry and, instead, make a decision based on how an ordinary
lay listener would hear the musical works at issue.206  The
ideal judge or jury, then, must have a "conveniently short"
memory in order to separate the testimony presented by the
expert on copying from their decision on improper appropria-
tion.20 7 It is unlikely that any trier of fact can make such a
separation.08
203. See Metzger, supra note 201, at 151-52. Metzger goes on to note that
even if similarity were to be based on the visual elements of music, i.e., the mu-
sical score, there is a kindred problem of musical illiteracy among the general
public. Id.
204. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 478 (2d Cir. 1946) (Clark, J., dissent-
ing) ("Further, my brothers reject as 'utterly immaterial' the help of musical ex-
perts as to the music itself (as distinguished from what lay auditors may think
of it, where, for my part, I should think their competence least) .. .
205. Kim, supra note 21, at 120-21.
206. See id. ("[Iln contemplating similarity between two works, triers of fact
with properly operating intellects cannot necessarily 'turn off,' during the sec-
ond-prong analysis, whatever experts may have shown them during the first-
prong analysis."); see also Metzger, supra note 201, at 178 ("The trier of fact
therefore hears the works, not as a lay auditor, but as a spectator who has
heard testimony by musical experts .... Thus exposed to critical analysis, the
trier of fact cannot realistically decide the question of improper appropriation as
would an average listener .... ).
207. LEAFFER, supra note 6, at 397.
208. Id. See also Brent, supra note 202, at 248 (noting that asking the lay
listener to disregard expert testimony is not only a questionable practice, but
also impractical).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
C. Idea-Expression and Sc~nes A Faire in Music
The court in Krofft stated that it was attempting to craft
a test rooted in the idea-expression dichotomy.2"9 However,
the overwhelming problem with practical application of the
Krofft test is that the idea-expression dichotomy is hard to
navigate when it comes to music. Two concerns arise when
considering the idea-expression dichotomy as it relates to mu-
sic. The first concern involves a determination of which mu-
sical elements should be considered. Second, there must be a
determination of whether those musical elements should be
considered individually or contextually. Under this second
determination, scones et faire patterns also merit considera-
tion.
As discussed in Part II.E, two important elements that
must be considered when examining music are melody and
harmony. Another highly important element is rhythm.210
One early writer called rhythm, harmony, and melody the
"three essential elements" of music.211 D. Anthony Ricigliano,
a frequent expert in music infringement cases, has identified
four elements: (1) melody, (2) harmony, (3) rhythm, and (4) a
combination of pitch, rhythm, and chords. 12 While rhythm,
harmony, and melody are indeed essential elements of music,
they should not be the only elements eligible for considera-
tion. In many instances, numerous other elements merit no-
tice, including timbre,21 3 tone, spatial organization, phras-
21421ing, accents, and interplay of instruments.2 5The tendencies and commonalities found in tonal music
209. Sid & Marty Kroffi Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1165 (9thCir. 1977).
210. For a basic discussion of rhythm, see KOSTKA & PAYNE, supra note 143,
at 28-40.
211. SHAFTER, supra note 29, at 197.
212. Stephanie J. Jones, Music Copyright in Theory and Practice: An Im-
proved Approach for Determining Substantial Similarity, 31 DUQ. L. REV. 277,
301 (1993) (citing personal correspondence between Jones and Ricigliano dated
February 3, 1992).
213. Timbre is the quality or tone color of a sound. See THE NEW HARVARD
DICTIONARY OF MUSIC, supra note 137, at 858.
214. Phrasing is to be distinguished from phrases, discussed supra text ac-
companying notes 160-65. Phrasing refers to the manner in which the per-
former of the music expresses the musical ideas during a performance, aside
from the phrases constructed by the composer in writing the music. See THE
NEW HARVARD DICTIONARY OF MUSIC, supra note 137, at 629.
215. See Brent, supra note 202, at 249.
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can be described as scnes e faire. Because composers, know-
ingly or unknowingly, tend to utilize the same basic patterns,
such as chord progressions and cadences, music can often
sound similar without actually being similar at all.216 Judge
Learned Hand once wrote: "It must be remembered that,
while there are an enormous number of possible permuta-
tions of the musical notes of the scale, only a few are pleasing;
and much fewer still suit the infantile demands of the popular
ear."
217
Simply because two musical works sound similar does
not necessarily mean that the similarity is due to improper
appropriation. What the fact-finder hears as similarity might
actually be scdnes & faire elements of music that are unpro-
tectible by copyright. 218  Because copyright does not protect
ideas, but rather the expression of ideas,2 19 and because
scnes e faire elements represent the "ideas" from which a
composer may draw when writing music, these elements are
unprotectible. 220  Expert testimony that discusses and takes
into account elements common to tonal music would allow the
fact-finder to distinguish more meaningfully musical "ideas,"
or musical sc nes e faire, from expression.221
The most important consideration is how each of these
elements should be considered during an inquiry into im-
proper appropriation. Even though the Krofft approach to in-
fringement is itself flawed, the "total concept and feel" ap-
proach 222 it advocates can prove useful in the context of
216. Moreover, it should be noted that each genre has its own larger struc-
tural forms and patterns which can be classified as sc~nes e faire. For instance,
pop songs tend to contain some variation of the structure verse-chorus-verse-
chorus-bridge-chorus, while classical music has its own stylized forms such as
sonata form, ternary form and rondo form. For more on traditional classical
forms, see KOSTKA & PAYNE, supra note 143, at 335-47.
217. Darrell v. Joe Morris Music Co., 113 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1940). Of the thir-
teen chromatic pitches available (all of the notes on the piano between one 'C'
and the next 'C' spanning an octave), there are "the amazing total of
6,227,020,800 combinations, of which only a small fraction may be used ordinar-
ily." SHAFTER, supra note 29, at 196.
218. Der Manuelian, supra note 49, at 146; Brent, supra note 202, at 247.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 94-101.
220. See Jones, supra note 212, at 301. Jones attempts a definition of a mu-
sical idea, positing that "[a] musical idea may consist of a single note, rhythm or
chord." Id. (citing personal correspondence between Jones and D. Anthony
Ricigliano dated February 3, 1992).
221. Kim, supra note 21, at 122.
222. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
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music. Due to the common ideas, or scnes t faire, that per-
vade tonal music, the "total concept and feel" approach can
deliver better results than the subtractive approach.223 This
is because combinations of elements may be overlooked by
strictly employing the subtractive approach to determine im-
proper appropriation. As the Supreme Court instructed in a
case involving compilation of factual information, "even a di-
rectory that contains absolutely no protectible written expres-
sion, only facts, meets the constitutional minimum for copy-
right protection if it features an original selection or
arrangement."'224
Selection and arrangement highlights the importance of
the "total concept and feel" approach precisely because music
is a contextual and hierarchical art where every note relates
to every other note to some degree. Because the subtractive
approach often does not consider the combination of elements,
but rather seeks to remove from consideration everything not
protectible by copyright, it is ill-suited for the music con-
text.2 25  In this respect, then, Arnstein was correct in pro-
nouncing that "dissection" should not be allowed when inquir-
ing about improper appropriation.226
Using the "total concept and feel" approach is also consis-
tent with the way composers construct music. Most compos-
ers do more than write an individual melody. Often, they
write a melody in the context of harmonic progression.227 As a
result, music is best understood through context. 228  Music
cannot be experienced in one moment, as can a painting; mu-
sic requires hearing the whole work over time to understand
how its individual parts relate to the whole.229 In the Swirsky
case involving Mariah Carey, the Ninth Circuit noted that re-
lying solely on individual elements results in an "incomplete
223. The subtractive approach is discussed supra Part II.B.3.
224. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991) (em-
phasis added).
225. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
226. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
227. Although he was found guilty of subconscious infringement, this is the
creative process described by George Harrison in Bright Tunes. See supra note
59.
228. Several commentators have also discussed the importance of preserva-
tion of context when it comes to musical works. See, e.g., Keyt, supra note 80, at
437-38.
229. See generally discussion supra Part II.E.
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and distorted musicological analysis. "230 Any meaningful
comparison of two musical works must be made contextually,
not as single "strings of acoustical events."231
Unfortunately, judges have demonstrated that they do
not have the tools to conduct the contextual analysis of music
needed to determine improper appropriation. One judge has
demonstrated this inability: "It is in the melody of the compo-
sition-or the arrangement of notes or tones that originality
must be found. It is the arrangement or succession of iusical
tones, which are the fingerprints of the composition, and es-
tablish its identity."232 Some judges, however, such as those
on the panel in Swirsky, have been more enlightened, noting
that "to disregard chord progression, key, tempo, rhythm, and
genre is to ignore the fact that a substantial similarity can be
found in a combination of elements, even if those elements
are individually unprotected. 23
3
V. PROPOSAL: A (NOT So) NEW TEST FOR MUSIC
INFRINGEMENT
The test proposed by this comment is not truly new, but
rather borrowed from the past. This proposal resembles the
test used before Arnstein suggested a bifurcated approach to
infringement. The proposed test consists of three elements:
access, expert testimony regarding similarity, and ultimate
determination of infringement by the trier of fact. A 1939
volume devoted specifically to musical copyright issues writ-
ten by Alfred M. Shafter indicated that these are the basic
elements to be proved in an infringement suit.234
Access is a crucial element. The plaintiff should be re-
quired to prove that the defendant had access to the plaintiffs
230. Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 848 (9th Cir. 2004).
Unfortunately, courts have often employed a simplistic analysis by only
looking at melody. In one of the earliest examples of this practice, Judge Hand
simply took the melodies found in both the plaintiffs work and the defendant's
work, transposed them to the same key, and then compared the melodies note
by note, completely disregarding harmony or rhythm. See Hein v. Harris, 175
F. 875, 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1910).
231. Keyt, supra note 80, at 437.
232. N. Music Corp. v. King Record Distrib. Co., 105 F. Supp. 393, 400
(S.D.N.Y. 1952).
233. Swirsky, 376 F.3d at 848.
234. SHAFrER, supra note 29. The attentive reader will note that the second
edition of Shafter's text was published in 1939, seven years before the 1946 Arn-
stein decision.
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musical work. While a great amount of similarity may be
used to infer access, 2 5 courts enter dangerous territory when
they allow a great amount of access to infer similarity. If a
musical work has reached a certain level of pervasiveness in
society, then this can serve as strong evidence of access. In
these situations, however, strong evidence of access should
not be allowed to compensate for a weak case of similarity." 6
When making a case regarding similarity, expert testi-
mony is crucial to demonstrate similarities between the work
of the plaintiff and the work of the defendant. Aside from
simply demonstrating similarity, however, the plaintiffs ex-
pert must also account for those similarities as similarities to
protected expression in the plaintiffs work. This will involve
looking at both works from the standpoint of a "total concept
and feel" analysis in such a manner that analytically explores
each important musical element in context.23 7 The elements
on which the expert chooses to focus are left to his or her dis-
cretion. Finally, the plaintiffs expert must demonstrate why
the elements he or she has shown to be substantially similar
are the product of unique expression, rather than the product
of musical scnes e faire common to the genre of music or to
tonal music in general.23' The defendant is then entitled to
235. See discussion of striking similarity supra text accompanying notes 35-
65.
236. See supra note 67.
237. See supra notes 222-28 and accompanying text.
238. Though beyond the scope of this comment, there are a wide variety of
analytical systems available for use by experts. Because music analysis can be
highly technical and is often not easily understood by even the most learned
person if he or she is untrained in music, there is the possibility that the plain-
tiffs expert could skew the analysis of the two musical works in question to
make the works seem more similar than they actually are. It is, of course, in-
cumbent upon the defendant's expert to debase the plaintiffs analysis if this
happens.
Unfortunately, one cannot expect jurors and judges to distinguish which
expert's analysis is more correct. Nor can one expect jurors and judges to dis-
tinguish which type of musical analysis is best suited to comparison of the mu-
sical works in question.
For an excellent discussion of both traditional and nontraditional modes
of analysis that have been used in music infringement cases, see Baker, supra
note 147, at 1596-1615.
Baker also suggests that "a uniform standard [of analysis] should be
adopted. The choice of a standard should be influenced by educated music ex-
perts in both copyright and academic fields. Guidelines are necessary to pre-
vent misleading and unreliable interpretations of evidence to reach the jury on
the issue of similarity." Id. at 1614.
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present his own expert to rebut any of the arguments made
by the plaintiff.
Relying upon each side's expert testimony, the trier of
fact is left to make the ultimate decision. This decision must
not only take into account the fact-finder's own impressions,
but also the evidence offered by the expert. Thus, the trier of
fact is not asked to ignore the expert's testimony, but rather
to embrace it in order to make a more fully informed decision
as to whether infringement has occurred.
This approach, while diminishing somewhat the impor-
tance of the lay listener, preserves its economic rationale.239
In other words, if that which the defendant appropriated
unlawfully was protected expression, and if that protected
expression was what made the musical work popular, then
the defendant will be found guilty of infringement. This ap-
proach also provides defendants a safeguard by allowing ex-
perts to testify as to both the elements of copying and im-
proper appropriation. Since experts will be encouraged to
comment on improper appropriation, the lay listener will not
be caught in the trap of finding similarity merely because
both musical works sound similar or because both musical
works are "catchy." This approach will also serve to encour-
age artists to continue to develop and expand that which
makes the genre of music in which they compose popular in
the first place. Composers will not be punished for writing
music that sounds similar to other music because they know
it will be popular. They will only be punished when their
copying goes so far as to constitute improper appropriation.24 °
VI. CONCLUSION
By limiting expert testimony during the improper appro-
239. See supra text accompanying notes 79-81.
240. See David May, So Long as Time is Music: When Musical Compositions
Are Substantially Similar, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 785, 791 (1987).
Since composers of popular music are often limited to the smaller pool
of musical possibilities common to a popular style when composing
works which, if successful, will reach the largest audience and yield
huge commercial returns, the economic and artistic repercussions from
even a relatively minor musical choice may be substantial. To compli-
cate matters, similarities between compositions in the same genre are
not only inevitable, but may also be somewhat desirable, as popular
composers feed off of each other's musical influence, and public de-
mand, to take the genre in innovative new directions.
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priation inquiry, the Arnstein and Krofft approaches have
proscribed expert testimony where it is needed most. Conse-
quently, these approaches have done more harm than good
for music infringement jurisprudence. Even more problem-
atic is that the determination of improper appropriation is
placed in the hands of a fact-finder who is supposed to act as
a lay listener. Because tonal music is constructed from a
foundation of common scnes e faire elements, two musical
works, especially those of the same popular genre, may sound
deceivingly similar. A musically untrained fact-finder may
find the similarities to be the product of improper appropria-
tion rather than simply a product of similar scnes e faire ele-
ments. Expert musical testimony should be used to reveal
whether the similarities are due to improper appropriation.
Allowing expert testimony will ensure that the fact-finder will
make a more informed decision regarding whether or not in-
fringement has occurred. The refined test for infringement
suggested by this comment includes three elements: (1) proof
of access; (2) proof of substantial similarity; and (3) a deter-
mination by the trier of fact as to whether infringement has
occurred. It is critical that the first two elements involve the
use of expert testimony in order for the trier of fact's ultimate
decision to be as informed and insightful as possible.
[Vol: 46
